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Privacy is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of individual 
freedom
, and its erosion w
eakens the constitutional founda-
tions on w
hich dem
ocracy and good governance have traditio-
nally been based in this country. 1
O
verview
Individual privacy and national security have been regarded 
as notions w
ith a conflicting im
pact. As seen in the U
K general 
election 2017, security has taken a prom
inent role on the 
C
onservative Party agenda w
hile public perceptions on privacy 
w
ere split. This article review
s the election m
anifestos of three 
political parties on privacy and security. W
e use the pre-election 
YouG
ov survey of 2017 U
K respondents to understand the view
s 
of the public by age groups and gender. W
hile there is general 
support for legislation aim
ed at strengthening national security and 
crim
e prevention, such as the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016, the 
younger segm
ent of the U
K population is increasingly concerned 
w
ith the infringem
ent of their privacy (both in traditional and 
online settings). These contrasting view
s m
ay explain the outcom
e 
of the general election in 2017, and offer open questions for 
legislators. 
The online privacy debate m
utates in post-
election Britain
The terrorism
 threat level in the U
K has been ‘severe’ since 2014, 
and w
ith four terror and several m
ajor cyber-attacks in recent 
m
onths 2 it is likely to rem
ain as such in the im
m
ediate future. 3 The 
use of encrypted com
m
unication by terrorists has led to increasing 
pressure upon com
panies to allow
 law
 enforcem
ent agencies to 
bypass w
ell-established privacy safeguards. 4 In addition, the recent 
cyber-attack that crippled the N
H
S dem
onstrated w
hy cyber-
security is a vital issue and one that can affect the w
ell-being and 
econom
y of an entire country. These events rem
inded people 
w
hat is at stake w
hen deciding w
hat data gathering and surveil-
lance pow
ers the governm
ent should have in the context of public 
safety and national security. 
Surveillance and com
m
unications data are seen as vital elem
ents 
in crim
inal investigations, public protection and ensuring national 
security. 5 Thus, the failure to collect and retain such data or 
surveillance evidence can lead to a collapse of the prosecution 
of suspects. 6 W
hile citizens increasingly use online services and 
readily im
part their personal/private inform
ation and data to both 
governm
ent (eg the N
H
S, H
M
RC
) and non-governm
ent insti-
tutions (eg banks, travel agencies) as a m
atter of necessity, they 
w
ant their privacy to be protected because they are also m
aking 
them
selves vulnerable to crim
inal activity. 7 For exam
ple, identity 
theft has been reported to be at epidem
ic levels in 2017. 8 O
nline 
and digital presence increase w
ith the activities people pursue. 
The consequent digital foot-print, assets and behaviour left behind 
in the ‘digital w
oods’ 9 as a ‘virtual treasure trove’ not only have 
an econom
ic and a sentim
ental value for us but also value for 
businesses, com
m
ercial advantage
10 and state functions. 11 It is in 
this context of both private and public security settings w
here the 
debate on privacy law
s in the U
K is evolving. Yet the questions 
around governm
ent surveillance, pow
ers to bypass security 
m
echanism
s of individual online and com
m
unication profiles, 
proposed control and financial penalties for digital econom
y 
giants, including social m
edia firm
s, rem
ain to be answ
ered by 
forthcom
ing proposed legislative changes. 
This article aim
s to provide insights as to the differences betw
een 
three political parties in their approaches to the U
K online security 
and privacy follow
ing the 2017 general election
12. In doing so it 
identifies m
ain concerns and areas of uncertainty. 
Introduction
In the U
K, there is no dedicated statute on privacy as such, 
and thus relevant legal provisions need to be extracted from
 a 
num
ber of international, regional and national legal instrum
ents, 
and the jurisprudence of the European C
ourt of H
um
an Rights 
(EC
H
R) including the International C
ovenant on C
ivil and Political 
Rights 1966; the European C
onvention on H
um
an Rights 1950; 
the U
K H
um
an Rights Act 1998 (H
RA); 13 the D
ata Protection 
Act 1998; the Regulation of Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2000; the 
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Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016; the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European U
nion 2007; 14 and the EU
 G
eneral D
ata Protection 
Regulation (G
D
PR) 2016. 15 W
hile these instrum
ents are m
eant 
to give us the ability to invoke our rights against undue interfe-
rence and significant pow
er im
balances in the context of privacy, 
they do not provide a definition of privacy. W
hile privacy is 
traditionally defined as ‘the ability for people to determ
ine for 
them
selves w
hen, how, and to w
hat extent inform
ation about 
them
 is com
m
unicated to others’, 16 for the purposes of this article, 
it is w
orth paying attention to the definition provided by Privacy 
International: 
Privacy is a fundam
ental right, essential to autonom
y and the 
protection of hum
an dignity, serving as the foundation upon 
w
hich m
any other hum
an rights are built. 17 
These other rights, w
hich often com
plem
ent each other, m
ay 
include inter alia freedom
 of thought, expression, conscience, 
religion, dignity and self-fulfilm
ent. They have relevance in  and 
im
plications for com
plex and disparate areas of our lives and 
individual autonom
y, and  thus w
arrant special protection from
 
interference by public (eg state) 18 and private entities. 
N
ow
 that the U
K general election is behind us, the w
heels of legis-
lative changes on privacy are set into m
otion under the influence 
of both prom
ises m
ade prior to the election and the recent cyber 
and terrorist attacks over the sum
m
er. Yet the understanding of 
the technical side of privacy protection as w
ell as the legal im
pli-
cations are not clear. 19 The U
K already has one of the highest 
levels of security m
onitoring in the w
orld, yet the recent cyber and 
terrorist attacks 20 have propelled privacy issues to the political and 
legislative agenda in the context of national security and crim
e 
prevention w
ith scant attention to hum
an rights im
plications. The 
proposed legal provisions w
ould give British law
 enforcem
ent and 
intelligence agencies an unprecedented overt access to private 
spaces so as to m
onitor citizens’ internet use – above all, their use 
of encrypted m
essaging services. 21 Thus, w
e are w
itnessing yet 
again another knee-jerk reaction in the form
 of the introduction 
of legislation
22 driven by cyber and terrorist attacks (proposals of 
sporadic fines for social m
edia, restrictions on car hire, W
hatsApp 
backdoor access, etc) as opposed to a w
ell thought-out  strategy of 
cyber security interventions over the forthcom
ing years. 23 
Background: pre-election positions 
In their respective m
anifestos, three political parties, the 
C
onservatives, Labour and Liberal D
em
ocrats, proposed m
ore 
than 100 crim
e and justice related policies betw
een them
. 24 In 
a tim
e of constant change and w
ith the ongoing uncertainty in 
the context of Brexit, security w
as used as a bargaining chip in 
the 2017 general election. All key parties focused on security 
assurance by changing the w
ays individual data is m
anaged 
online. W
hile all political parties em
phasised the im
portance of 
cyber-security in their agenda, they offered different view
s on 
how
 to achieve it and handle individual rights to privacy.  
The C
onservative Party
The C
onservative Party m
anifesto had the m
ost to say about 
individual data privacy and took a bold position on cyber-security. 
D
espite having introduced the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016 
that allow
s governm
ent to access detailed records of everyone’s 
internet activity, the C
onservatives seem
ed so concerned about 
privacy that the w
ord appeared six tim
es in the m
anifesto. 25
The m
anifesto pledged data safety through new
 legislation, stating 
the party ‘w
ill deliver protections for people’s data online, backed 
by a new
 data protection law
’. 26 Yet the m
anifesto provided little 
detail about how
 this w
ould be done and w
hether it w
ould align 
w
ith the forthcom
ing regulatory changes stipulated by the EU
 
G
eneral D
ata Protection Regulation. 27 
Any organisation handling EU
 consum
er data w
ill be forced to 
com
ply w
ith the new
 G
D
PR that com
es into force in M
ay 2018. 
The m
anifesto em
phasises that privacy is im
portant but its regula-
tion rem
ains opaque: ‘For the sake of our econom
y and our 
society, w
e need to harness the pow
er of fast-changing techno-
logy, w
hile ensuring that our security and personal privacy – and 
the w
elfare of children and younger people – are protected.’ 
Because the C
onservatives’ position on their new
 data privacy law
 
is unclear, it adds yet another level of uncertainty and potentially 
new
 challenges for data com
pliance. 28
The C
onservatives have set out plans to m
ake online regulation 
m
ore sim
ilar to that governing the offline w
orld
29. The m
anifesto 
states:
If w
e are going to respond to rapid changes in technology, w
e 
need a governm
ent to m
ake Britain the best place in the w
orld 
to set up and run m
odern businesses, bringing the jobs of the 
future to our country; but w
e also need governm
ent to create 
the right regulatory fram
ew
orks that w
ill protect our security 
and personal privacy, and ensure the w
elfare of children and 
younger people in an age w
hen so m
uch of life is conducted 
online. 
The C
onservatives prom
ised to develop a digital charter that w
ill 
bring individual privacy to the forefront of the technology debate, 
yet m
ake online service providers share responsibility for privacy 
protection.
There is also an indication that technology com
panies w
ill be 
required to give the governm
ent access to any encrypted com
m
u-
nications and data. 30 This w
ould m
ean creating a backdoor to 
personal data, underm
ining the secure nature of encrypted 
m
essages including popular services such as W
hatsApp and 
Telegram
. G
iven the increasing challenge of keeping data safe 
from
 cyber-attacks – and that public sector and governm
ent 
services are particular targets for hackers, cyber crim
inals and 
terrorist organisations and hostile state actors – the governm
ent 
should think carefully before trying to justify this m
ove.
Another hallm
ark prom
ise from
 the C
onservatives revolved 
around safety for children online, and to require social m
edia 
com
panies to delete inform
ation about young people w
hen they 
turn 18. Erasing m
illions of profiles across m
ore than 20 social 
platform
s w
ith data storage across the w
orld is a tall order. The 
C
onservative M
anifesto goes further:
W
e w
ill give people new
 rights to ensure they are in control 
of their ow
n data, including the ability to require m
ajor social 
m
edia platform
s to delete inform
ation held about them
 at the 
age of 18, the ability to access and export personal data, and 
an expectation that personal data held should be stored in a 
secure w
ay.
It is not clear, how
ever, w
hat the legal position w
ould be if users 
do not w
ant their data deleted, or w
ant to keep part of it. Such 
user preferences could be seen as a big burden for social m
edia 
and other com
m
unications com
panies. 31 There is also a proposal 
for m
ore privacy control: ‘W
e w
ill institute an expert D
ata U
se 
and Ethics C
om
m
ission to advise regulators and parliam
ent on 
the nature of data use and how
 best to prevent its abuse’. 32 The 
C
onservatives w
ent further still by suggesting that they w
ould also 
introduce an industry-w
ide levy from
 internet and com
m
unication 
com
panies to fund online safety and protection cam
paigns, sim
ilar 
to the approach taken w
ith the gam
bling industry. 33 W
hile there is 
som
e evidence of links betw
een social m
edia and m
ental health 
issues, 34 equating the internet w
ith gam
bling is a big step to take 
by a party otherw
ise so keen to m
ake the digital econom
y central 
to its m
anifesto.
To sum
 up the position, the C
onservatives adm
it falling behind on 
the regulation of em
ergent technologies: 
The opportunities and threats arising from
 the advance of 
digital technology pose significant practical and philosophical 
challenges [..]. They accelerate the pace of change – ushering in 
new
 norm
s in the space of years rather than decades; challen-
ging our law
s and regulations to keep pace. 35
The Labour Party
Those keen to find out m
ore about Labour’s position tow
ards data 
privacy are bound to com
e across a rather opaque m
anifesto. 
The Labour Party M
anifesto stated that: ‘Labour is com
m
itted 
to grow
ing the digital econom
y and ensuring that trade agree-
m
ents do not im
pede cross-border data flow
s, w
hilst m
aintai-
ning strong data protection rules to protect personal privacy.’ 
Very little substantive details w
ere provided on w
hat law
s w
ould 
underpin these rules; how
ever, it seem
s very likely that a Labour 
G
overnm
ent w
ould keep the G
D
PR in its current form
at.
The m
anifesto proposed an appointm
ent of a digital am
bassador 
to liaise w
ith technology com
panies, prom
oting Britain as an 
‘attractive place for investm
ent’. 36 H
ow
ever, there w
as not m
uch 
substantive detail on how
 the position and the role of this poten-
tial am
bassador w
ould contribute to data privacy issues.
Labour’s position on cyber-security also lacked definition. 
Although it adm
itted that individual rights and civil liberties are 
at tim
es com
prom
ised, it prom
ised to apply investigatory pow
ers 
proportionately and only w
hen necessary and ‘reintroduce’ ‘effec-
tive’ ‘judicial oversight over how
 and w
hen they are used, w
hen 
the circum
stances dem
and that our collective security outw
eighs 
an individual freedom
’. 37 The latter prom
ise indicates that Labour 
is w
ell aw
are of the hum
an rights jurisprudence and intends to 
align any future policy to it.
H
ow
ever, in contrast to its stance in the m
anifesto, the Labour 
Party opposition to the oversw
eeping pow
ers introduced by 
the Investigatory Pow
ers Bill w
as virtually non-existent. O
nly 
five Labour M
Ps voted against the Bill. 38 Thus the Bill becam
e a 
statute largely w
ithout the public discussion and in defiance of 
the 100,000 strong petition to hold it back. 39 Labour proposed 
to continue to ‘m
aintain the cross-border security co-opera-
tion agreem
ents w
ith our intelligence partners in Europe and 
beyond’. 40
The Liberal D
em
ocrats
The Liberal D
em
ocrats stood on the other end of the spectrum
, 
w
hereby their efforts on ensuring societal security did not resonate 
w
ith the electorate. 41 They prom
ised to end the m
ass surveil-
lance pow
ers of the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016 and opposed 
the unrestricted collection of com
m
unications data and internet 
records. They also proposed to create a digital ‘bill of rights’ to 
protect individuals’ privacy and to exercise m
ore control over 
their online data. The m
anifesto failed to articulate w
hat such 
rights w
ould be and how
 they w
ould be protected w
hile prom
i-
sing to counter the C
onservatives’ efforts to create back doors to 
encryption m
echanism
s. 42 The pledge to hold another referendum
 
on Brexit is an evidence of the Liberal D
em
ocrats’ com
m
itm
ent to 
the EU
 and the acquis therein. 
W
hat is the w
ay forw
ard?
W
ith such a variety of w
hat are often vague positions on data 
privacy and digital surveillance, the m
ain parties have given the 
electorate a few
 options to consider. An im
portant one is w
hat a 
proportionate use of cyber-surveillance should look like. At the 
sam
e tim
e, there are serious questions about how
 our data is 
protected online and w
hether som
e of the m
easures proposed 
w
ill even w
ork. The C
onservatives’ prom
ise that the U
K w
ould 
be ‘the safest place to be online’ is an am
bitious claim
 in such an 
interconnected w
orld and one that is yet to be realised. First, in 
the interests of social cohesion and ensuring that the rule of law
 is 
observed, it w
ill be im
portant to m
onitor if and how
 the provisions 
of the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016 are used. This is because 
covert investigations and operations have profound im
plications 
for the relationship betw
een citizen and the state in a dem
ocratic 
society. 43 Second, in the interests of legitim
acy and accountability, 
as w
ell as future law
 and policy reform
, it is im
portant to assess if 
and to w
hat extent the provisions of the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 
2016 w
ill deliver the desired results. 44
U
K public perception on privacy
The governm
ent plans for a m
ore w
idespread, intrusive and covert 
surveillance cam
e to the lim
elight and dom
inated the m
edia and 
public opinion in the run up to the general election. It is said to 
be unusual for the British public to be so acutely aw
are of regula-
tory changes. 45 D
riven by the new
 privacy lobby – instigated  insti-
gated largely by the Liberal D
em
ocrats – the privacy debate stirred 
the opinions of the electorate. N
evertheless, the governm
ent’s 
position has rem
ained firm
, w
ith the conviction that the m
ainte-
nance of national security (the context in w
hich the state has the 
w
idest m
argin of discretion) depends on m
ass data collection, 
retention and analysis by the latest technological tools. H
aving 
said that, the new
 legislative provisions under the Investigatory 
Pow
ers Act 2016 ‘dram
atically increase safeguards on privacy 
and oversight’, partly thanks to the recent jurisprudence pertai-
ning to the sphere of privacy rights. The survey data collected by 
YouG
ov during this tim
e (n =
 2017, m
ale 48%
 fem
ale 52%
 G
B 
Adults) show
s polarised view
s on state surveillance. 46 Respondents 
w
ere asked w
hether w
hen using the internet they w
ere 
concerned about the online surveillance of U
K citizens by the U
K 
G
overnm
ent. The results 47 revealed that U
K G
overnm
ent surveil-
lance clearly w
as not the biggest concern overall; rather issues 
such as cyber-crim
e, com
panies m
isusing private data, inappro-
priate content accessible to children and fake new
s topped the 
list. H
ow
ever, w
hen analysed by gender groups, concerns about 
state surveillance w
ere m
ore w
orrying for m
ale than fem
ale 
respondents (see fig 1). O
n the other hand, cyber-attacks that use 
the internet to disrupt life in Britain (eg online theft and leaking of 
classified inform
ation or disrupting the function of w
ebsites and 
services) w
ere of equal concern to both m
ale and fem
ale citizens. 
Age differences influenced the greater concerns expressed by the 
younger generation (18-24) versus older internet users (65+
) over 
governm
ent surveillance. W
hile the latter age group w
ere m
ore 
concerned about cyber-crim
e, cyber-attacks, and m
isuse of data 
by com
panies as w
ell as fake new
s and propaganda, they w
ere 
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m
uch less concerned about U
K G
overnm
ent surveillance than the 
younger users (as seen in fig 2). 
D
issim
ilarities in the public’s attitude as to w
hether national 
security overshadow
ed privacy concerns w
ere revealed in the 
survey. W
hen asked w
hether m
ore should be done to protect the 
privacy of ordinary people, even if this put som
e lim
its on w
hat 
the U
K G
overnm
ent could do to fight crim
e or protect national 
security, only 26 per cent of the public agreed. W
hile 30 per cent 
of younger adults supported the statem
ent, the older generation 
appeared m
uch less concerned (19%
).
A sim
ilar divide w
as evident in the opinions of the older genera-
tion in favour of giving m
ore support to ‘the U
K G
overnm
ent to 
fight crim
e or protect national security, even if this m
eans the 
privacy of ordinary people suffers’. This w
as supported by 50 per 
cent of older people, versus only 17 per cent of younger indivi-
duals favouring security over privacy. Furtherm
ore, the survey 
gathered view
s regarding the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016 
w
hich allow
s the U
K G
overnm
ent agencies to access data such 
as the content of m
essages stored on specific com
puters, m
obile 
devices and netw
orks. This kind of targeted surveillance requires 
a w
arrant signed off by an independent judge. W
hen asked about 
support to this form
 of targeted surveillance by U
K G
overnm
ent 
agencies, 52 per cent of respondents gave a positive answ
er. 
The age group difference w
as still prom
inent, w
ith 33 per cent 
of younger individuals com
pared to 69 per cent of respondents 
aged 65+
 favouring targeted surveillance. M
ass data retention 
w
as also backed by the U
K population as a w
hole at 38 per cent, 
w
hich increased to 52 per cent for the 65+
 age group com
pared 
to 25 per cent for the younger generation. O
verall, the perception 
of the Investigatory Pow
ers Act 2016 w
as that the Act generally 
m
akes us all safer as perceived by 47 per cent, w
ith a predic-
table rise to 65 per cent of supporters am
ong older respondents. 
The 2017 data show
ed general support for the U
K G
overnm
ent 
priority for national security w
hen it cam
e to surveillance versus 
privacy. 48 
Im
plications for practice
The respect for privacy and the right to privacy enable us to 
‘protect ourselves and society against arbitrary and unjustified use 
of pow
er, by reducing w
hat can be know
n about us and done 
to us, w
hile protecting us from
 others w
ho m
ay w
ish to exert 
control’. 49 W
ith the increased use of online technology, indivi-
duals store personal inform
ation, express personal opinions, 
interact w
ith each other and conduct business. Recent theore-
tical m
odels of personal inform
ation privacy em
phasise conti-
nued loss of control over personal inform
ation betw
een parties 
transacting online
50. In online transactions users are losing out 
to service providers. This transfer of control now
 includes third 
parties (eg content aggregators, agencies and governm
ent) as w
ell 
as forth parties (eg m
alicious entities, hostile states and hacktivists). 
Accordingly, the concept of privacy is no longer confined to ‘w
hat 
happens behind closed doors’ and include personal inform
ation 
in all form
s (digital or otherw
ise). 51 So, given the fundam
ental 
im
portance and value placed on inform
ational autonom
y
52 and 
privacy, w
hat should be the lim
its of public and governm
ent inter-
ference in this sphere?
The EC
H
R jurisprudence dem
onstrates that the m
argin of appre-
ciation conferred to the state authorities in this regard depends on 
the circum
stances of each case. The court’s review
 of interference 
w
ith privacy w
ould also depend on the actor (public or private) 
on w
hom
 the obligation or duty to respect privacy w
as placed. 53 
As is the case for protection of private data under the G
D
PR, 54 the 
governm
ent is under a duty to act positively to prevent an interfe-
rence w
ith the Article 8 guarantees by another private individual 
and/or a com
pany. In the event of an interference being necessary, 
such interference m
ust be prescribed by law, 55 and pursue a legiti-
m
ate aim
 clearly and precisely; 56 there m
ust also be appropriate 
safeguards in place in order to protect citizens form
 arbitrary inter-
ference and abuse. 57 The exceptions for interference are confined 
to areas stipulated by Article 8 (2) of the H
RA 1998:
There shall be no interference by a public authority w
ith the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance w
ith the 
law
 and is necessary in a dem
ocratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the econom
ic w
ell-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crim
e, for the 
protection of health or m
orals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedom
s of others.
In the context of national security, the state m
ay justify its inter-
ference w
ith ease as the m
argin of appreciation w
idens in this 
context. 58 H
ow
ever, this does not provide a blank sheet to the 
governm
ent. There are still a num
ber of thresholds and safeguards 
in place w
ith regards to surveillance, search, interception and 
investigation of crim
inal activity. 59 For exam
ple, oversight and 
authorisation by a court m
ay be required
60 (as is the case in the 
U
K
61) w
hereby a sunset clause and review
 of the interference on 
individual privacy can be m
onitored and a fair balance can be 
struck betw
een the security interests of the state and the privacy of 
individuals.  It is also w
ell established that citizens w
ho have been 
subject of unauthorised surveillance and other form
s of interference 
in their privacy are entitled to an effective legal rem
edy. 62 
The exception pertaining to the interest of ‘the econom
ic w
ell-
being of the country’ w
as considered in Pow
ell and Rayner v 
U
K, 63 w
hereby the court acknow
ledged that a fair balance has 
to be struck betw
een the com
peting interests of the individual 
and of the com
m
unity as a w
hole. The court ruled that noise 
levels em
anating from
 aircraft traffic did not violate Article 8, and 
could be justified ow
ing the econom
ic interest of the country. 
As e-com
m
erce and online transactions and business activity are 
com
m
on features of our current econom
y, it w
ould not be difficult 
to infer that interference in online privacy can be justified (subject 
to safeguards) under this heading. 
In the context of crim
e prevention and law
 enforcem
ent, neces-
sity and proportionality tests w
ould be applied in light of the 
seriousness and gravity of the crim
e involved. For instance, in 
M
urray v U
K (a case involving terrorist offences), 64 the EC
H
R ruled 
that the recording of personal details and the taking of a photo-
graph w
ithout a person’s consent in the context of a house entry 
and search did not violate Article 8.  Later, in Tele2 Sverige and 
W
atson cases, the C
ourt of Justice of the EU
 (C
JEU
) confirm
ed that 
access by com
petent national authorities to retained data m
ust 
be restricted solely to fighting serious crim
e, and subject to prior 
review
 by a court or an independent adm
inistrative authority. 65
As a brief consideration of the legal principles that apply to 
respect for privacy or the interference in privacy (as the case m
ay 
be) dem
onstrates, there are num
erous boundaries w
ithin w
hich 
any legal and regulatory reform
 can take place. 66 These bounda-
ries can be considered as positive obligations, and justification 
benchm
arks placed on both state authorities and private entities 
(persons and organisations). 67
Brexit effects on privacy
D
riven by the grow
th concerns for the digital econom
y and 
effective law
 enforcem
ent, the U
K G
overnm
ent feels that there 
is a need to continue data sharing processes betw
een cross-
border law
 enforcem
ent agencies. 68 Existing m
echanism
s for 
data sharing betw
een U
K and the EU
 need to be m
aintained in 
order to avoid com
prom
ise of national security. This m
eans that 
the U
K G
overnm
ent acknow
ledges that any significant m
odifica-
tion of the existing data sharing relationships w
ould have detri-
m
ental consequences for U
K security and ultim
ately dam
age 
the functioning of and prospect for the British digital econom
y.  
The im
portance of the digital sector to the British econom
y 
cannot be underestim
ated. 69 According to the recent statics, the 
digital econom
y contributed just over 7 per cent of the British 
G
VAA or £118.4 billion in 2015. The digital econom
y provides 
a grow
ing volum
e of jobs; in 2015 it created around tw
o m
illion 
jobs, evidencing a steady increase year on year. 70 Am
idst these 
challenges, the U
K is going ahead w
ith forging the future of its 
data protection regulation and the EU
 inform
ation-sharing m
echa-
nism
s in the post-Brexit era. The governm
ent’s am
bition is to 
achieve high data protection standards and ensure privacy of U
K 
individuals. O
n the other hand, the governm
ent recognises the 
im
pact of the w
ithdraw
al from
 the EU
’s legislative and regulatory 
fram
ew
orks on digital econom
y firm
s, and aim
s to ensure confi-
dence and business continuity in the Brexit process. 
The final em
phasis is on the assurance of cross-border coope-
ration by  law
 enforcem
ent agencies.  The M
inister of State for 
D
igital, M
att H
ancock, sum
m
arised these objectives as follow
s: 
‘O
ur goal is to com
bine strong privacy rules w
ith a relationship 
that allow
s flexibility, to give consum
ers and businesses certainty 
in their use of data.’ 71 
In contrast, in 2016 the H
ouse of C
om
m
ons highlighted the U
K 
governm
ent’s position tow
ards digital econom
y regulation strategy 
as follow
s: ‘The governm
ent has, in general, taken a hands-off 
approach to regulation, w
anting to stim
ulate grow
th of the digital 
econom
y’.
In August 2017, the governm
ent’s position is focused on transfor-
m
ing U
K-EU
 relationship into a ‘new, deep and special partner-
ship’ for exchanging and protecting personal data w
hich:
■
■
continues safely to exchange data in a ‘properly regulated w
ay’;
■
■
ensures business confidence and provides certainty for 
individuals;
■
■
continues to cooperate in the regulatory space betw
een the 
EU
 and the U
K on current and future data protection issues, 
w
hile avoiding the im
position of additional financial liability on 
businesses;
Figure 1: G
ender differences  in state surveillance concerns
Figure 2: Age differences  in state surveillance concerns
Privacy, security and politics: current issues and future prospects
Privacy, security and politics: current issues and future prospects
W
hich of the follow
ing issues you are concerned about? G
ender D
ifferences
W
hich of the follow
ing issues you are concerned about? Age groups
Cyber-bullying
O
nline surveillance
Propaganda
Com
panies data processing
Inappropriate content
Cyber-attacks
Cyber-crim
e
Cyber-bullying
O
nline surveillance
Propaganda
Com
panies data processing
Inappropriate content
Cyber-attacks
Cyber-crim
e
00
1010
2020
3030
4040
5050
6060
7070
8080
Fem
ale
M
ale
Total
Total
65+
18-24
131
C
om
m
unications Law
 Vol. 22, N
o. 4, 2017
130
C
om
m
unications Law
 Vol. 22, N
o. 4, 2017
Running head
■
■
em
phasises individual privacy protection; and
■
■
establishes Britain as a leader in data protection, w
hile m
aintai-
ning U
K sovereignty. 
Echoing the w
ords of the m
anifesto concerning ‘evidence-based’ 
application of security m
echanism
s, the governm
ent plans to 
forge its new
 U
K-EU
 data exchange m
odel ‘based on objective 
consideration of evidence.’ 72 Indeed, on 8 August 2017 the U
K 
G
overnm
ent launched a consultation on its plans to im
plem
ent 
the Security of N
etw
ork and Inform
ation System
s D
irective (N
IS 
D
irective), 73 com
m
only know
n as the C
ybersecurity D
irective. The 
N
IS D
irective
74 w
ill require certain categories of critical infras-
tructure providers to take steps to address the increasing num
ber 
of cyber threats. The consultation follow
s the governm
ent’s 
announcem
ent of its intention to introduce a new
 D
ata Protection 
Bill that w
ill im
plem
ent the provisions of the European G
eneral 
D
ata Protection Regulation (G
D
PR).  Both pieces of legislation 
w
ill take effect in M
ay 2018, 75 and both confirm
 the intention of 
the U
K G
overnm
ent to m
aintain standards consistent w
ith the 
European U
nion in relation to the digital environm
ent even after it 
leaves the EU
.
The N
IS D
irective w
ill not apply to all organisations, but only to 
‘operators of essential services’ in the energy, transport, banking, 
financial m
arket infrastructures, health sector, w
ater and digital 
infrastructure sectors. Broadly, it w
ill require these organisations to 
im
plem
ent appropriate security m
easures, and to notify incidents 
to the com
petent authority. H
ow
ever, the specific details w
ill be 
decided by individual M
em
ber States, and are yet to be finalised.   
In contrast, the G
D
PR w
ill apply to any business, public authority 
or charity established in the EU
 that uses inform
ation about living 
individuals, w
hether em
ployees, custom
ers or suppliers. It w
ill also 
apply to any business located outside the EU
 that offers goods and 
services to citizens in the EU
, or m
onitors citizens’ behaviour in 
the EU
. The proposed legislation im
poses a num
ber of standards 
upon organisations to w
hich it applies. It specifies that organi-
sations m
ust not only keep personal inform
ation secure, but 
that they have a duty of transparency tow
ards the individuals to 
w
hom
 the inform
ation relates.  According to M
r H
ancock, ‘our 
data relationship should continue’. 76 The U
K is leading the w
ay 
on m
odern data protection law
s, and has w
orked closely w
ith 
EU
 partners to develop w
orld-leading data protection standards. 
This is in direct opposition to the recom
m
endations of the D
igital 
Econom
y Report 2016-17, w
hich stated that:
Regulation should be based on agreed principles, and also 
flexible enough to adjust to disruption. It should, in our view, 
put the interests—
in term
s of quality, choice, cost and safety—
of the consum
er first, although not at the expense of em
ploy-
m
ent rights.
Im
portantly, in the afterm
ath of Brexit it is not clear w
hether the 
jurisdiction of the C
ourt of Justice of the EU
 w
ill apply to the U
K, 
and if so how
 it w
ill operate. W
hile the m
ain regional hum
an 
rights instrum
ent, the European C
onvention on H
um
an Rights 
1950, is adjudicated at Strasbourg (the European C
ourt of H
um
an 
Rights), thus binding on the U
K as a signatory, the PD
G
R and 
other EU
 secondary legal instrum
ents pertaining to privacy, digital 
data and econom
y, are adjudicated by the C
JEU
. 
The Prim
e M
inister, Theresa M
ay, m
ade it clear that the jurisi-
diction of the C
JEU
 w
ould end once the U
K leaves the EU
. 77 
H
ow
ever, if U
K com
panies w
ant to operate in the EU
 Single 
M
arket then they w
ill have to com
ply w
ith EU
 law
 and accept 
the jurisdiction of its courts. It is very unlikely that the EU
 w
ould 
allow
 the U
K to access the Single M
arket w
ithout accepting the 
fundam
ental rules governing it, including the jurisdiction of the 
C
JEU
. Subseqently, the U
K G
overnm
ent’s current stance leaves a 
plethora of areas – including   digital econom
y, privacy, and other 
fundam
ental rights of EU
 citizens – in a state of uncertainty. 
Technical controls and com
pliance 
challenges in the tim
e of transform
ation 
The leading position of the U
K on m
odern data protection 
has show
n that w
orking closely w
ith the EU
 partners facilitates 
developm
ent of w
orld leading data protection standards.  The 
report ‘O
nline platform
s and the digital single m
arket’ issued by 
The H
ouse of Lords Select C
om
m
ittee on the European U
nion in 
2016  argued against the creation of a platform
-specific regulatory 
regim
e, stating:  ‘to protect consum
ers and to ensure that m
arket 
pow
er is not abused, w
e recom
m
end that existing regulators 
should be vigilant in these m
arkets’. 78
A further proposal from
 the Parliam
entary C
om
m
ittee on the 
D
igital Econom
y
79 advised that  ‘the governm
ent explore w
ays 
in w
hich com
pliance solutions can be developed, to ensure a 
m
ore collaborative approach to regulation that involves users and 
providers.’ Thus far the im
balance of control over personal infor-
m
ation lies critically w
ith the latter, leaving individual users w
ith 
superficial influence over how
 their personal inform
ation is used. 
These view
s w
ere reflected in the YouG
ov survey for the younger 
generation (18-24 years) w
ho w
ere significantly concerned over 
the potential m
isuse of their personal inform
ation by com
m
ercial 
com
panies as w
ell as providing a difficult obstacle for governm
ent 
objectives to use intelligence prioritising national security over 
privacy.  In this article w
e provided evaluation of the current legal 
regim
e governing privacy in the cyberspace.  According to the 
governm
ent: 
In the m
odern w
orld, data flow
s increasingly underpin trade, 
business and all relationships. W
e w
ant the secure flow
 of data to 
be unhindered in the future as w
e leave the EU
. 
W
e offer a critical assessm
ent of the changing position of U
K 
privacy regulation and its societal and technical im
plications, 
and concur w
ith the  M
inister for D
igital that, ‘a strong future 
data relationship betw
een the U
K and EU
, based on aligned data 
protection rules, is in our m
utual interest.’
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nion, 14 June 
2017
Introduction
O
n 14 June 2017, the C
ourt of Justice of the European U
nion 
(C
JEU
) handed dow
n its long-aw
aited judgm
ent in Stichting Brein 
v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV (C
-610/15), 1 clarifying further 
the concept of the right of ‘com
m
unication to the public’ w
ithin 
Article 3(1) of D
irective 2001/29/EC
 (the InfoSoc D
irective), and 
establishing the conditions under w
hich an internet operator has 
responsibilities for copyright infringem
ent. This judgm
ent follow
s 
the request for a prelim
inary ruling under Article 267 TFEU
 
from
 the H
oge Raad der N
ederlanden (Suprem
e C
ourt of the 
N
etherlands). 
The ruling, w
hich follow
s the opinion of Advocate G
eneral 
Szpunar 2 states that the actions of the operators of an online 
sharing platform
 such as The Pirate Bay (TPB) in m
aking available 
and m
anaging access to protected w
orks, and by indexing torrent 
files allow
ing internet users to locate and dow
nload these w
orks 
through a peer-to-peer netw
ork, constitute a ‘com
m
unication to 
the public’ w
ithin the m
eaning of Article 3(1).
For the past decade ‘com
m
unication to the public’ has been an 
evolving topic subject to a series of decisions. The term
 is present 
not only in the InfoSoc D
irective but also in D
irective 2006/115/
EC
 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related 
to copyright. 3 U
nder D
irective 2006/115/EC
, this concept has 
been addressed in Verw
ertungsgesellschaft Rundfunk G
m
bH
, 4 PPL 
(Ireland), 5 and SAG
E. 6 In the internet era, ‘com
m
unication to the 
public’ under the InfoSoc D
irective has been considered in recent 
cases such as Svensson and O
thers, 7 G
S M
edia, 8 and BestW
ater 
International. 9 W
hile these cases considered the secondary 
com
m
unication of w
orks through hyperlink, Stichting Brein v Ziggo 
concerned an original com
m
unication m
ade on a peer-to-peer 
netw
ork. In addition, the present case is significant because the 
liability of internet providers for copyright infringem
ent is consi-
dered for the first tim
e at European level by the C
JEU
. 10 Previously 
all relevant C
JEU
 decisions focused on related injunctions against 
these operators w
hose platform
s w
ere used by third parties to 
infringe. 11
Background to the judgm
ent
The right of ‘com
m
unication to the public’ is provided by Article 
3(1) of the InfoSoc D
irective as follow
s:
M
em
ber States shall provide authors w
ith the exclusive right 
to authorise or prohibit any com
m
unication to the public of 
their w
orks, by w
ire or w
ireless m
eans, including the m
aking 
available to the public of their w
orks in such a w
ay that 
m
em
bers of the public m
ay access them
 from
 a place and at a 
tim
e individually chosen by them
.
Article 3(1) originated from
 Article 8 of the W
IPO
 C
opyright Treaty 
1996, but it does not define w
hat am
ounts to ‘com
m
unication to 
the public’ or ‘m
aking it available to the public’, leaving the inter-
pretation to the discretion of the court. 12 
Stichting Brein is a D
utch anti-piracy foundation, w
hich safeguards 
the interests of copyright holders, w
hile Ziggo and XS4ALL are the 
tw
o m
ain internet access providers in the N
etherlands. TPB is one 
of the biggest and best-know
n file-sharing sites, w
hich provides 
access to m
usical and cinem
atographic w
orks. The files shared are 
free of charge, and 90 to 95 per cent of them
 are protected w
orks 
distributed w
ithout the consent of the right holders. 13  
In January 2012, Stichting Brein applied to Rechtbank’s-
G
ravenhage (D
istrict C
ourt of The H
ague) for an order that Ziggo 
and XS4ALL block access to TPB. That application, granted by 
the court of first instance, w
as overturned by the G
erechtshof”s-
G
ravenhage (the C
ourt of Appeal in The H
ague) in January 2014 
on tw
o grounds. 14 First, it w
as the recipients of the services of the 
defendants in the m
ain proceedings (and not TPB) w
ho w
ere the 
originators of the copyright infringem
ents. Second, the blocking 
sought w
as not proportionate to the aim
 pursued, nam
ely the 
effective protection of copyrights. 15
The decision w
as appealed to the H
oge Raad der N
ederlanden 
(Suprem
e C
ourt of the N
etherlands), w
hich established that 
TPB m
ade protected w
orks available to the public w
ithout the 
right holders’ consent and that subscribers of Ziggo and XS4ALL 
infringed copyrights, but w
as undecided w
hether TPB m
ade a 
com
m
unication to the public w
ithin the m
eaning of Article 3(1) 
of D
irective 2001/29. Therefore, in January 2015, the Suprem
e 
C
ourt referred the tw
o follow
ing questions to the C
JEU
:
1 
Is there a com
m
unication to the public w
ithin the m
eaning of 
Article 3(1) of D
irective 2001/29 by the operator of a w
ebsite 
(TPB), if no protected w
orks are available on that w
ebsite, but 
a system
 exists …
 by m
eans of w
hich m
etadata on protected 
w
orks w
hich are present on the users’ com
puters are indexed 
and categorised for users, so that the users can trace and 
upload and dow
nload the protected w
orks? 
2 
If Q
1 is answ
ered in the negative, do  Article 8(3) of D
irective 
2001/29 and Article 11 of D
irective 2004/48 offer any scope 
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